Paris, le 18 mars 2017.








1. Monde terrestre et économie fermée.

Notre monde, la Terre, est l'exemple même de l'économie fermée chère à certains théoriciens et, à ce titre, humour..., on peut considérer que les gens qui s'y trouvent, à savoir vous et moi, sont nécessairement ... protectionnistes et se protègent naturellement de ... l'univers (à supposer qu'il n'existe pas des "multivers"...).

Dans les frontières du monde, ils peuvent, certes, faire montre de laissez-faire et de laissez-passer, mais il y a toujours une protection économique contre l'extérieur, de fait.


2. Monde terrestre et états.

Reste que le monde terrestre est composé d'états, aux mains d'hommes plus ou moins libres.
Chaque état est censé représenter ces mêmes gens, un pays, une nation, une société selon la préférence politique qu'on adopte.

Et il y a les hommes de l'état.

Surtout depuis le XXème siècle, les hommes des états des pays ont des actions plus ou moins coordonnées dans divers domaines économiques.


3. Monde terrestre et monnaies.

Le monde terrestre est ainsi composé de diverses monnaies, nationales ou régionales, réglementées par les hommes des états d'une presque totalité des pays (cf. ce texte d'août 2013).

Une chose est certaine : la cause d'existence des monnaies n'est pas à leur initiative, mais à celles des gens, des ancêtres de vous et moi, qui les ont inventées il y a donc bien longtemps et qui ont évolué.

a. Réglementations étatiques.

Malgré ce qu'ils disent, nos hommes des états ont décidé et mis en œuvre des réglementations des monnaies sans raison, sans cause, tout au long de l'histoire et, plus que jamais auparavant, au XXème siècle (cf. ce texte de juillet 2014) ou celui-ci de mai 2010).

Au prétexte de la prétendue contrefaçon à venir toujours possible d'une monnaie et nuisible pour les gens, ils se les sont appropriés en privilège dans le passé et ont obligé ces mêmes gens à les utiliser (cf. ce texte de juin 2013).

En dépit des innovations monétaires qui ont vu le jour depuis lors, là encore à l'initiative des gens et non pas des actions des hommes de l'état, ces derniers ont adopté la même méthode (protéger contre la "prétendue contrefaçon") et le même remède (le privilège de monopole qu'ils donnent à une entité étatique ou se donnent et l'obligation aux gens d'utiliser le produit).

Et ils en sont arrivés à les dénaturer.
Exemplaires sont en effet les méfaits qu'ils ont commis au XXème siècle et qui ont résulté de leurs actions dites de "politique monétaire" (cf. par exemple ces textes :
1 - Le monde entre crise et krach.
- Le capitalisme financier : un merveilleux pléonasme.
- Ce qui arrive devait-il arriver ?
- Le "marché financier brisé"
5 - Le retour à l'étalon-or est la solution libérale.

- Nouvelle réflexion sur les ajustements financier et économique en cours.
- A phénomène mondial, cause mondiale.
- Le F.M.I. : pompier pyromane de notoriété pas encore publique.
- Il fallait le trouver, le G20 l'a fait.
10 - Un grand écart ? Non, une hyperinflation potentielle !

- Prêter aux Etats nationaux ou prêter de l'or, "that is the only question".
- "G20 ?"-"Dans l'eau !" .
- Le refus de la fausse monnaie : un iceberg que le G20 n'aurait pas du ignorer.
- Yuan et boule de gomme.
15 - "Euroïsme" ou héroisme.

- Monnaie, finance et hommes de l'Etat : derniers exploits en date.
- Le G20, "C 20".
- "Plus ça change, plus c'est pareil");


l'avant-dernier en date étant l’interdiction de la conversion des "substituts de monnaie bancaires" en monnaie par les législateurs des pays et, contre toute attente, la signification "monnaie" donnée malgré tout par chacun, aux "substituts de monnaie bancaires", désormais "néant habillé en monnaie", "pseudo monnaie" (cf. ce texte d'août 2013).

b. Changement de perspective réglementaire étatique.

Mais aujourd'hui, leur vivendi modus a changé.

A les écouter, s'ils prennent soin d'augmenter toujours plus les réglementations des "pseudo monnaies", ce n'est plus pour protéger les gens contre la contrefaçon du "machin monétaire".
Leur mutisme sur le sujet est d'ailleurs éloquent.

Ils le font pour ... le développement économique des pays.
Selon eux, leur gestion de la quantité de la "pseudo monnaie" par leurs soins doit permettre d'accroître ce développement (idée développée avec de la monnaie et des substituts de monnaie bancaires, depuis au moins Irving Fisher, 1911, cf. ce texte d'octobre 2012).

Ils affirment ainsi l'absurdité nouvelle du XXème siècle.

c. Un peu d'histoire.

Relisons ce qu'en écrivait David Laidler dans une conférence de 2001, pour préciser une partie de ces sources.

                           5. The inter-war years.
                                        
The international gold standard, whose piecemeal creation in the 1870s had prompted the bimetallic controversy, survived until the beginning of World War I, but not because of any intellectual victory on the part of its supporters.

Rather the discovery of the cyanide process made it possible economically to exploit South African gold deposits from the mid-1890s onwards, and this, along with gold discoveries in the Yukon at about the same time, was enough to set the world's supply of monetary gold growing more rapidly than real output.

Two decades of deflation came to an end, a mild inflation which would persist until 1914 began, and bimetallism lost its main political rationale.


It is also worth noting that the leading monetary economists of the era, Marshall, Fisher and Wicksell, each according to his own lights a quantity theorist, had supported neither side in the bimetallic controversy.

All three favoured price-level stability as a policy goal,
but all three thought it possible to improve upon both gold and bimetallic standards to provide it.19)
19). Marshall (1887) favoured symetallism supplemented by widespread voluntary indexation of capital and labour market contracts,
Fisher (1911) suggested indexing money itself by way of his compensated dollar scheme, while
Wicksell (1898) proposed an international paper money whose value would be stabilised by interest rate movements coordinated among the world's central banks.

I have discussed these matters in more detail in Laidler (1991).


Thus, despite the failure of the bimetallic cause with which it had been intimately associated, the quantity theory remained associated
- with scepticism about the gold-standard policy rule, and hence
- with what it is fair to call 'progressive' thought on economic policy.

It continued to occupy such a position after World War I.

This is quite evident, for example, in the well-known role it played as the intellectual foundation for Keynes's discussion, in the Tract on Monetary Reform, of the potential for conflict between the pursuit of domestic price stability and exchange rate stability, and his preference for the former in the event that a choice here should become necessary.

And a monetary approach to the analysis of macroeconomic stability that started from the quantity theory also underpinned Hawtrey's less radical, but nevertheless novel, proposals for re-establishing an international gold standard under which monetary measures would be co-ordinated among countries with a view to giving the stabilisation of prices, income, and employment pride of place on the policy agenda.20)
20). These were embodied in the Genoa Resolutions of 1923, but came to nothing.


Even so, in Europe in particular, the quantity theory was beginning to lose intellectual ground in the 1920s.

Though Wicksell (1898) might have intended to do no more than extend the quantity theory to cope with contemporary institutional realities when he developed his famous 'cumulative process' analysis, the longer-run effect of his efforts on monetary economics was to shift its emphasis
- from the quintessential concern of the quantity theory with the relationship between money and the price level,
- towards the influence of the rate of interest on saving and investment, and hence to questions about the inter-temporal allocation of resources.


This theme was, as Leijonhufvud (1981) emphasised, to become central to what we now call macroeconomics in the interwar years.

And the element in Wicksell's work that proved seminal here was the 'pure credit economy model' of Chapter 9 of Interest and Prices in which bank liabilities adjusted endogenously, even passively, to prices.

In the hands
- of both Austrians such as Hayek and
- of the Stockholm School,
Wicksell's work became the starting point for competing non-even anti-quantity theory analyses of the fundamental causes of cyclical fluctuations which were associated with opposite ends of the political spectrum.21)
21) For a discussion of the contributions of these two groups, and the relation of their work to Wicksell's, see Laidler (1999, Chs 2 and 3).


Interacting with this powerful internal dynamic element in the development of economic theory, moreover, was the fact that, once the postwar hyperinflations had come to an end, chronically high unemployment became the key policy question in Europe; and by its very nature as a theory of the price level, the quantity theory had nothing direct to say about this matter.

Matters were somewhat different in American monetary economics.22)
22). I have discussed the role of American monetary economics in the interwar years, and its relationship to the development of macroeconomics more generally, in Laidler (1999, Chs 9 and 10).


In (1998) Mehrling proposed a more complex classification for analysing the development of American monetary economics than that which I adopt in this section of the current paper, in which advocates of the quantity theory and Banking School positions are further subdivided according to whether they supported
- policy rules or discretion and/or
- active or passive approaches to monetary policy.

I intend no criticism of Mehrling's taxonomy in expressing the hope that the simpler one adopted here is adequate for the purposes of this chapter.

There, gold convertibility had been maintained during the War and the 1920s were, overall, a decade of prosperity.

There was also a relative lack of explicit interest in intertemporal allocative questions in general, and a slowness to appreciate the importance of Wicksell's ideas in particular, among mainstream American economists.


After the bimetallic controversy, their discussions had turned to issues of central banking, and the Federal Reserve system had been established in 1913.

It was natural enough, then, that the 1920s would find American monetary economists debating the role of this new institution, and that the quantity theory would play a part in their discussions.

Furthermore, at its onset after 1929, the Great Depression looked to most American observers like a particularly bad cyclical downturn, and monetary theories of the cycle of which the quantity theory formed a key component, not to mention policy nostrums derived from them, figured prominently in the literature it prompted.

On the whole, however, even though the quantity theory was still not associated with conservative causes in the United States, its connection with the radical left that has been so close in the 1880s and 1890s had been weakened.

That was because the boundaries within American economics and politics had shifted.


The quantity theory continued to occupy an important position in neoclassical monetary theory, but in America in the 1920s, neoclassical economics was challenged from the left
- by institutionalism, in particular
- by the radical version thereof originally developed and propagated by Thorstein Veblen (e.g. 1904) and later
- by such advocates of wholesale economic planning as Rexford Tugwell (eg. Tugwell, Munro and Stryker 1925).

In the monetary field, moreover, the under consumptionism of Foster and Catchings (e.g. 1923) had taken over as the preferred intellectual basis for inflationist policy proposals.23)
23). It is worth noting that Paul Douglas's 1932 book The Coming of a New Party embraced both planning and underconsumptionist arguments for fiscal and monetary expansion.


I suspect that Simons' (1934) A Positive Program for Laissez Faire should be read as an attack on Douglas, though I have no direct evidence to support this conjecture.

When compared to these doctrines, even Irving Fisher's quantity theory-based campaign to subject the Federal Reserve system to a legislated price stability mandate, let alone Allyn Young's support for cautiously activist stabilisation policy based on his own adaptation of Hawtrey's ideas to American conditions, were very much in the middle of the road.

The word 'middle' is not used lightly here, however, for the same body of economics that had underpinned the conservative case for gold monometallism in the 1890s had also provided much of the intellectual basis for the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, and it remained extremely influential throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, not least at the Federal Reserve Board in Washington.24)
24). Note that when Mehrling (1997) discussed Young's work as seeking a 'middle ground' in monetary economics, the two extremes that he had in mind were represented by this conservative group's Banking School ideas, and Fisher's quantity theory.


From the point of view of analysing the development of competing strands in what was to become American neoclassical monetary economics, this classification seems to me to be absolutely appropriate, but when the economic basis of inflationist and more generally interventionist politics is the subject of discussion, as it is in this chapter, it is necessary to recall the existence of radical institutionalism and under consumptionism.

The early 1930s in the United States are sometimes thought of as being a time when financial interests, supported by influential neoclassical economists, opposed any attempts to stabilise the 'Great Contraction', but finally met their political nemesis with the coming of the Roosevelt administration and its 'New Deal'.
This is, of course, a gross oversimplification of events, but like most such oversimplifications there is a core of truth lying behind it.
There was indeed much opposition to policy activism from the financial community in the early 1930s, and it did find support among economists.

These were not, however, neoclassical adherents of the quantity theory, but the anti-quantity theory supporters of the gold standard and the 'Real Bills' Doctrine such as Benjamin Anderson, Henry Parker Willis, and indeed their mentor Laughlin himself who remained intellectually active until his death in the early 1930s.25)
25). As I have noted in Laidler (1999, Ch. 10) there is a loose relationship between
- the views of this group and
- those of such 'Austrian' theorists based at the London School of Economics, as Friedrich von Hayek (1931) and Lionel Robbins (1934).


However, these Americans lacked the well-worked-out theory of the cycle, deeply rooted in capital theory from which the Austrians derived their policy conclusions.

It is worth noting in passing here, that Friedman (1974) singled out the London group as exponents of an atrophied version of the quantity theory to which he contrasted favourably the version in circulation in Chicago at that time.
It is, of course, quite erroneous to attribute any shape or form of quantity theory to this group.
They were totally and explicitly opposed to it.

Setting out this group's position in 1933, Laughlin criticised 'the English writers of today' for being

'imbued with a strong belief in the quantity theory' (p. 229).

Here he singled out Keynes as someone who

'had . . . gone to extremes in supporting inflation and the abandonment of the English gold standard' (p. 231).26)
26. But he explicitly excepted TE Gregory, then at the London School of Economics, who was deeply influenced by Austrian ideas, without being entirely under their influence.
It is not, perhaps, coincidental that Gregory was an authority on the work of Thomas Tooke, the leading figure in the Banking School.
I am grateful to Robert Leeson for drawing my attention to Laughlin (1933) from which this and other quotations used here are drawn.


For Laughlin, the Depression was the result of

'a debauch in credit and overspeculation' (p. 275)

and recovery depended upon a revival of

'production of saleable goods which is the only way of developing purchasing power' (p. 273).

'In reality, demand comes from other goods before money or credit enters on the scene' (p. 220)

and

'to increase the medium of exchange as a remedy when there are less goods to be exchanged is fatuous' (p. 285).

This all too influential viewpoint was opposed by many, perhaps most, American academic economists at the time.


The early 1930s were a time of widespread support among them for activist expansionary monetary, and indeed fiscal, policies, much of it based, if not directly on the quantity theory, then at least on an analysis of the cycle that derived from that doctrine.

Lauchlin Currie (1934) was one of the most coherent advocates of such measures, and his analysis was essentially Hawtreyan at this juncture, yielding views on the causes of and remedies for the Great Contraction largely anticipating those later set out by Friedman and Schwartz (1963a).27)
27. I have discussed the interconnections here in some detail in Laidler (1993).


His characterisation of the place of the quantity theory in all this was as follows:
- In the past an altogether disproportionate amount of importance was attached to variations in the supply of money.
- In consequence of the almost universal abandonment of the quantity theory of money, however, there is a danger that the pendulum may swing too far in the opposite direction so that the effect of variations in the supply of money may be unduly minimized (p. 3).


Currie was more than just a quantity theorist then, he was also a vigorous and explicit critic of the 'Real Bills' Doctrine in general.

More specifically, he deplored the role it had played in both the Federal Reserve system's policies of 1927–28, which were aimed
- at curbing the supply of bank credit for speculative purposes but had resulted in slowdown in money growth to which Currie attributed the onset of the contraction, and
- in creating what he termed the system's 'almost complete passivity' thereafter.

Small wonder, then, that his book was the subject of a scathing review by Anderson (in the New York Times Annalist, May 3, 1935) which began by branding Currie as

'the uncompromising advocate of an extremely tight and inflexible version of the quantity theory' (p. 662)

and went on, among other things, to criticise him for holding a

'[t]heory opposed to all accepted principles of banking' (p. 662),

for displaying a

'complete misunderstanding of 1927–29 developments' (p. 662)

and

'inadequate knowledge of actual banking practices' (p. 670),

while indulging in

'the fallacy of cheap money as a substitute for economic readjustment' (p. 670);

and so on in this vein..


The important point about Currie in the context of this chapter is
not only that he attracted an attack from Anderson for having offered a critique of Federal Reserve Policy that derived from a version of the quantity theory, albeit a much more subtle one than Anderson gave him credit for.

It is also that his work attracted the attention of Jacob Viner of the University of Chicago, who invited Currie to join his 'Freshman brains trust' in Washington, thus setting in motion a career that quickly saw him become economic advisor to Marriner Eccles at the Federal Reserve Board, and then to President Roosevelt himself.

To the extent that association with the inner councils of the 'New Deal' confers progressive credentials on an economic theory, the quantity theory was still well endowed with them in the mid-1930s.

The landscape of both economic policy and economic theory was, however, changing rapidly at that time, and this would soon affect the location of the quantity theory in the political spectrum.

To begin with, the influence of Laughlin and his associates waned quickly as the decade progressed.
As with the intellectually related, albeit more rigorously based, policy pessimism of Austrian business cycle theorists, there were few takers in the intellectual market place for economic ideas that implied that a policy of waiting out the depression was the only viable option.

Second, as the Depression continued in the United States, an ongoing build-up of free reserves in the banking system convinced many who would earlier have given pride of place to expansionary monetary measures that these were no longer likely to be effective.

Homely comparisons of such policies to 'pushing on a string' came into vogue, and the emphasis among policy activists shifted to the fiscal side.

Here it is significant that Currie himself was one of the architects of the increases in required reserve ratios that were instituted in 1937 with the aim of mopping up excess liquidity in the banking system that, it was feared, might at some future time provide the basis for excessive and inflationary money creation.

Though Currie would hardly have entertained such fears had he not retained some residual belief in a version of the quantity theory, it is equally clear that he had come to believe that, by 1937, the monetary authorities no longer retained control over the supply of money, independently of factors affecting the demand for it.28)
28). At this point, then, Currie's interpretation of monetary factors in the 1930s diverges sharply from that of Friedman and Schwartz (1963a), for they held the slowdown in money growth that followed these measures responsible for the economy's sharp contraction in 1938.


Currie blamed this contraction on an inadvertent tightening of fiscal policy.

But other exponents of the quantity theory had also given up on it before 1937, crucially that bête noire of Laughlin and his associates, John Maynard Keynes.

The Tract on Monetary Reform (1923) had rested on a straightforward and quite unoriginal exposition of the Cambridge version of the quantity theory,
but in the Treatise on Money (1930) its author had sought to integrate that theory with a Wicksellian analysis of the influence of the rate of interest on savings and investment.

Though this (not altogether successful, but that is another story) effort had left Keynes a firm advocate of expansionary monetary policy based on open market operations as a remedy for unemployment, and hence as anathema to Laughlin et al. as ever, the critical variable which he sought to affect was
no longer the quantity of money,
nor its rate of growth,
but rather the level of the long run rate of interest.

By 1930, Keynes's view of monetary policy's transmission mechanism had thus shifted away from anything that could be associated with the quantity theory towards a Wicksellian mechanism whose critical linkages ran through bank rate
to the long interest rate and thence to investment spending,
with the supply of money adjusting passively to maintain equilibrium with its demand.

Given associated changes in the total quantity of money and in the effective level of bank rate respectively, it is via the latter that the ultimate modification in the purchasing power of money is generated, looking at the problem dynamically.

The order of events is not that a change in bank rate affects the price level because, in order to make a new bank rate effective, the quantity of money has to be altered.

It is, rather, the other way around.

A change in the quantity of money affects the price level in the first instance because . . . this means a bank rate which will change the market rate of interest relatively to the natural rate . . .

If we start from a position of equilibrium, then – provided that efficiency earnings are stable – the condition for the continued stability of price levels is that the total volume of money should vary in such a way that the effect of the corresponding volume of bank lending on the market rate of interest is to keep the volume of new investment at an equality with current saving (1930, I, p. 197, Keynes's italics).

Dennis Robertson (1931) suggested that Keynes was here dealing with a 'hen and egg' situation of no importance, but this is surely not so.

To emphasise the rate of interest and volume of bank lending as the critical variables for monetary policy, and
to treat the quantity of money as passively adjusting to validate their consequences, is to adopt exactly the view of the working of monetary policy that later appeared in the Radcliffe Report, which, as I have already noted, could trace its ancestry to the anti quantity theory position
of the Banking School and
of the gold monometallists of the 1880s and 1890s.


Given Keynes's earlier credentials as a quantity theorist, this was a step of great significance in the development of monetary thought, and one of lasting importance, the use of an exogenous money supply assumption at certain points in the General Theory, notwithstanding.29)
29). The latter is most conspicuous in the General Theory where the efficacy of money-wage cuts is discussed as an hypothetical rather than a practical policy, and as has often been noted, discussions of the monetary system are conspicuous by their absence from the General Theory.


That is why I am one of those who believe that, overall, the treatment of this topic in the Treatise was in no way superseded in the later book.

And, it should be recalled, the Radcliffe Committee explicitly invoked Richard Kahn's evidence as the immediate authority for their own views on the issue.

And it should be noted that Keynes's version of this theory, just as surely as Laughlin's, can be traced to the Banking School, this time by way of Wicksell who had, like Laughlin, been deeply influenced, though in a very different direction, by Thomas Tooke, perhaps the leading exponent of Banking School ideas in the 1830s and 1840s.


Now what has been described here was a migration from the political right to the left on the part of the quantity theory's rival, the endogenous money doctrine of the Banking School.

This idea's links to the political right had mainly been derived from its affiliation with the gold standard during the bimetallic controversy, and they persisted into the 1930s in American monetary thought.

The combination of Wicksell's espousal of what amounted to endogenous money in his 'pure credit economy' model, however, along with his simultaneous advocacy of managed inconvertible currencies had already put this alliance under stress in the 1890s, and a clear-cut break came when Keynes, who had always been sceptical of the gold standard, embraced the Wicksellian viewpoint in 1930 just prior to Britain's abandonment of gold convertibility in 1931.

Even so, the story of the shifting political associations of monetary theories in the 1930s also involves a more or less simultaneous journey towards the right on the part of the quantity theory.

In the 1920s, the quantity theory had provided the underpinnings of Irving Fisher's campaigns for imposing by act of Congress a price-stability rule on the Federal Reserve system and a crucial step in the quantity theory's rightward move was taken when this idea of subjecting monetary policy to a legislated rule was adopted by members of the economics department of the University of Chicago in the early 1930s, and in particular by Henry Simons.30)
30). Initially Simons had opted for a constant money-supply rule, but shifted to a price-level rule in 1936.
His failure to refer to Fisher as an earlier exponent of this idea in the latter paper was surely not as reprehensible as it might now look, for the simple reason that Fisher's advocacy of it would have been common knowledge to Simons' intended readership.


The association of a distinctive 'Chicago Tradition' with the quantity theory in the early 1930s,
the alleged imperviousness of that tradition to 'Keynesian' ideas later in the decade, as well as
its influence on Friedman's monetarism,
have been much debated in recent years, so suffice it here simply to state those of my own views on these matters that are relevant to the current discussion:
there was little in the way of positive analysis that was unique to Chicago in the early 1930s;
Simons' statement of the case for a legislated monetary policy rule as an integral component of his 1934 Positive Program for Laissez Faire, however, established the quantity theory in a distinct and novel ideological context;
and finally, Simons' work was influential in shaping the ideas of the later Chicago School of which Friedman's monetarism would in due course become an important component. 31)
31). I have developed and defended these positions at greater length in Laidler (1993, 1997 and 1999, Ch. 10).


Even so, the populist, as opposed to conservative in the traditional sense, characteristics of Simons' (1934) Program must be noted.

There was much in it that would have appealed to the progressives of an earlier era, and which even perhaps derived from their agenda, but which was missing from the body of doctrine with which Friedman's monetarism would later be associated.

Simons favoured, for example, the vigorous pursuit of antitrust policies, as well as serious income redistribution through a tax transfer system.32)
32). Tobin (1981) noted these differences between Simons' agenda and Friedman's.
Perry Mehrling first drew my attention to the relationship of Simons' policy programme to populist ideas.

I also owe to him the caveat that Simons' populism should be explicitly distinguished from altogether darker, even proto-fascist, versions of such doctrine, associated, for example, with the likes of Father Charles Coughlin.

These attracted much support in the 1930s.
Reeve (1943) is a useful source of information on these matters.

And this is not to mention the fact that another element in his Program, which did find its way into Friedman's postwar work, was the institution of 100 per cent reserve requirements against chequable bank deposits, a measure which would have had the effect of transferring the prerogative to create money from the banks to the government, just as those earlier progressives had also advocated.

If Simons' agenda was no longer classifiable as leftist in the 1930s and thereafter, that was more
- because a large segment of the left had adopted new goals and analytic tools by them than
- because Simons was opposed to all of the populist ideas with which the quantity theory had been associated forty years earlier." (Laidler, 2001)



4. Dernière absurdité en date.

Aujourd'hui, des socialistes (style "Hamon") laissent entendre qu'il leur serait possible de donner aux gens des quantités de "pseudo monnaie" - qu'ils dénomment "revenu universel" - pour consommer un "minimum..." de ce dont ils auraient besoin ou désireraient. 

Le propos est effarant et effrayant.

Un minimum de connaissances en économie politique devrait pourtant leur interdire d'avancer de telles absurdités, sauf à vouloir dénommer d'une nouvelle expression, ce dont ils continuent à rêver malgré l'esclavage à quoi il a donné lieu dans le passé, à savoir le communisme.

Mais personne ne leur oppose l'absurdité, à commencer par les trop fameux 'journalistes' (en mémoire un "débat") !






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